Great Final Caps Australia's Greatest Year
A review of the World Cup Final
Australia won the World Cup Final in Ahmedabad on Sunday to earn their 6th title beating a great Indian side thanks to brilliant 137 from Travis Head and a masterful display by their great fast bowling trio. It was Head’s second extraordinary innings of the year against IND following his 163 in the World Test Championship Final in June which accounted for most of the 209 run margin of victory in that match. The other AUS bats managed 3/86 in 138 balls between them, while Head managed 137 in 120.
For at least three World Cups now, IND have been desperate to find all-round capability in their eleven. Hardik Pandya, Ravindra Jadeja, Vijay Shankar, Stuart Binny, Shardul Thakur, Washington Sundar, R Ashwin and a few others have been tried. The all-rounder provides extra depth and extends any eleven. In ODI cricket since 2015 the powerplay rules have made it increasingly difficult for part-timers to ply their trade except in unusually favorable circumstances. The share of bowling by batters in the top six batting positions for their team has dropped from 4960/25425 (19.5%) balls in the 2011 World Cup to 3852/25399 (15.2%) in 2023. It was 18.6% in 2015 and 17.3% in 2019. In 1996, the last time the World Cup was in the sub-continent before 2011, this figure stood at 27.8%. Batters batting in the top six have contributed, on average, 7.3 overs out of 50 in the 2023 World Cup compared to 14 overs in 1996, and 9.5 overs in 2011.
With Hardik Pandya and Ravindra Jadeja in their middle order, India could play Shardul Thakur at number 8 to provide them with some extra batting ability. Thakur and Pandya could share the 5th bowler’s overs. Pandya’s presence also allowed India to play R Ashwin when the conditions suggested a third spinner. Losing Pandya to injury meant that India had to find two replacements. They used Suryakumar Yadav at number 6, and Mohammed Shami at number 8. This improved the batting quality of the number 6, and bowling quality at number 8, but now, suddenly, instead of three handy options with bat and ball in the lower middle-order, IND had only 1. This meant trading depth with both bat and ball for quality.
Most of the time, it worked. But there was bound to be a time when it wouldn’t work, especially batting first. It made IND peculiarly vulnerable to the kind of game where they were put in, and had to get a score. Now, IND’s top six is still very very good, and they’re still a handful for most opponents most of the time. But if their hand is ever weak, it is here. It is also better for a line up batting against the current IND bowling line up to know a target rather than to be in a “get as many as you can” situation. When IND bat first with a long tail, early wickets force the middle order into caution. Losing 3 wickets in the first 61 balls (albeit for 81 runs) put IND in this position.
The high quality AUS bowling made it especially difficult for IND on a slow wicket on which it was not easy to play on the rise. Their extra height made their short-of-a-length bowling especially effective against batters trying to score. In a Test match, if they bowled that length, the consensus at the end of the session would have been that they were a bit too defensive and a bit too short. In a contest of control, the batter can comfortably ignore that defensive length, and wait for the occasional more attacking variation (which will be either fuller or straighter or wider). Against batters who are seeking to score - in a contest of efficiency - defensive lengths are effective.
In effect, AUS did to IND what IND has done to teams all tournament. The potency of the IND attack comes from the fact that they rarely bowl very attacking lengths or lines. They bowl good lengths relentlessly, get the ball to do as much as possible off the pitch, and wait for the error for the batter. This works in ODIs because batters have to keep trying to score runs and so are prone to errors. To settle for 2 or 3 an over is to concede too much to the bowling side in an ODI. The batter has to try and score 5 or 6. The AUS trio of fast bowlers found those lengths and sat back and got 7 wickets between them.
When India bowled, they couldn’t just sit back, because AUS needed less than five an over. They had to attack and chase wickets more than usual. That they felt the need to do this is evident from the fact that Mohammed Shami was offered the new ball ahead of Mohammed Siraj. The ask was modest and AUS had a lot of batting to get that modest target. They had to be bowled out.
The third spoke which made up IND’s wheel of misfortune in the World Cup final was Travis Head. Until 2023, Travis Head had played 10 Test innings and 5 ODI innings against IND and survived 100 balls in only 1 out of these 15 innings. In 2023, he has done it in 3 out of 12 innings against them. He’s an attacking player who takes chances, and if he survives for a 100+ balls, he reaches big scores. In those three innings, Head’s scores have been 90 not out (in Ahmedabad to save the Test), 163 (in the World Test Championship Final) and 137 (in the World Cup Final).
Before Sunday’s final the record suggested that there were fewer ways in which AUS could beat IND than there were in which IND could beat AUS. But, the two teamsheets also suggested that there were an unusual number of players who, going by their exploits in the tournament and in their careers so far, could individually exert significant influence on a 50 over fixture. AUS’s top three (even when Head was injured) had demonstrated this in the tournament, as had Glenn Maxwell.
This current AUS generation is serially underrated, mostly because of the very long —shadow cast by the AUS of the long Taylor-Waugh-Ponting era. Even in the 2023 Ashes, the common refrain was that this AUS were not really that good. This type of conventional wisdom is difficult to shake regardless of the evidence.
It is true that while AUS currently possess extraordinary quality and depth in every department of the game in all three formats (perhaps more so than they did in any earlier era), other contemporary teams (IND, ENG, NZ) do so as well. So it is true that AUS do not possess a deadly advantage in any department of the game. But that describes why they are not as dominant as they were 20 years ago. It does not describe why they possessed more quality 20 years ago. The Waugh/Ponting era AUS played one series against a side with a bowling attack possessing the quality and depth of the IND, ENG, NZ and SA attacks of the last 5-6 years - the 2005 Ashes in ENG. They also managed to lose to one bowler in IND in 2001. A large part of the aura of Shane Warne and Glenn McGrath was because other teams of the time did not have anyone comparable. It is a mistake to condemn Cummins, Hazlewood, Starc, Lyon, Smith and all the other contemporary AUS greats just because other teams are also currently really good.
The two best teams in the world, two of the greatest cricketing generations in the history of the game (they compare favorably with the West Indians of the late 70s and early 80s) in the middle of arguably the greatest cricketing rivalry in the history of the game, met in the 2023 World Cup final. If one is a cricket fan, it is a privilege to be able to watch this. In 2023 AUS have paid IND back for Brisbane with interest.
AUS are a magnificent team, led by the supreme fast bowler of his era (he has Jasprit Bumrah and Kagiso Rabada for competition, he’s probably better than those two in my view, though this might perhaps have to do with Pat Cummins being my favorite contemporary player). They are World Test and ODI Champions - the champion cricket team of the day. It is hard to imagine better winners.
Thanks for this. I was wondering if we have control percentage/false shots numbers for the main batters? Was rewatching this recently and felt like Head survived quite a few "play and miss" in the first 10-15 overs.